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With the trend in American merchandising toward "trade in the
old when you buy the new" and "if it's newer it must be better, so
scrap the old," the question might be asked as to why a policyowner
should not surrender his old insurance when he buys new.
Some individuals have reacted indignantly to full disclosure
regulations adopted by life insurance regulatory authorities for the
protection of the public. "Don't try to tell me I can't cash in my
policy," they have said, "If I want to surrender my old insurance,
no one can stop me."
It is often difficult to prevent people who are determined to take
foolish actions from doing so, but the answer to "Why not trade in
the old?" is quite simple. With life insurance we are not dealing
with an automobile or a TV set or a washing machine. We are deal-
ing with a contract for the future delivery of dollars, and once
having such a contract and having paid the bulk of its acquisition
costs, it is usually not to the advantage of the owner to "scrap it and
start over." If more dollars are needed for future delivery, by all
means contract for them on the most favorable basis possible, but
beware of any salesman who urges a "scuttling act.on," especially
one who would seek to cut you off from receiving "the other side
of the story" from the agent or company with which you already
own life insurance.
The abuses in this area are so prevalent that the insurance de-
partments of a number of states, Nebraska among them,1 have
recently instituted new regulations designed to furnish greater
protection for the public by assuring adequate disclosure of ma-
terial facts in any replacement recommendation or suggestion.
* B.S. 1935, Northwestern University, School of Commerce. Member
Delta Mu Delta, Honorary Scholastic, and Kappa Alpha Lambda, Pro-
fessional fraternities. C.L.U. (Chartered Life Underwriter) designa-
tion conferred (1940) by American College of Life Underwriters.
C.L.U. in Management conferred (1961). Life Underwriter 1935-1958.
President (1950-51) and National Committeeman (1951-55), Life
Underwriters Association of the City of New York. President (1956-
57) and National Committeeman (1957-58), New York State Associa-
tion of Life Underwriters. Superintendent of Agencies (1958 to pres-
ent) of The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin.
1 Nebraska Department of Insurance, Department Rule No. 32, effective
March 1, 1969.
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If replacement is effected by means of incomplete or inaccurate
or misleading information, the act is termed "twisting," and is
illegal. Although victims of "twisting" are entitled to recovery,
most people are reluctant to admit that they have been duped. So
caution, in advance, is better than trying to "unwind a twist" after
it has occurred.
Abuses in inducing the unwarranted and unwise replacement of
life insurance are not new. They have been going on in the United
States for about a hundred years. During all this time the tech-
niques of the replacers have followed much the same pattern,
namely, to infer that the owner of life insurance is being over-
charged, and to offer a cheap substitute, usually some form of term
insurance.
In the 1870's the controversy was between agents of the legal
reserve life insurance companies, which offered guaranteed whole
life coverage at a level premium, and the assessment societies or
"cooperatives" as they were then called, who sold term insurance
on the "buy now, pay later" plan-with the "later" costs rising to
prohibitive heights at the time in life when people were least able
to afford them.
This is the way one newspaper in 1874 exposed the fallacy:
If a farmer sells one bushel of wheat for one dollar, he is expected
to give full measure, and the purchaser receives the worth of his
money. This truism applies to genuine life insurance.
Genuine Life Insurance
But suppose people didn't know how much wheat it took to make
a bushel, and that some fellow was scamp enough to advertise
that he could sell one bushel of wheat for, say fifty cents, and
that he should prepare a measure with a false bottom, like that
shown below; the analogy between that fellow and the cooperatives(assessment insurance organizations) would be complete.
Cooperative (Assessment) Life Insurance -. Cr
A-B False Bottom C-D Extent of Fraud
D
The cooperative companies pretend to give the same protec-
tion as the genuine life insurance companies for one-half the price,
when in fact the real protection furnished by them is not one-
fourth of that furnished by any of the regular life companies.
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Whenever any standard article is offered to the public at
remarkably cheap rates, it is a good idea to stop and inquire if
it is not 'too cheap to be good' and probably examination will
reveal that there is a false bottom somewhere.2
It is a bit ironic that some 95 years later, in spite of readily
acquired knowledge of atomic energy and transplants of human
organs, many educated and otherwise intelligent people have not
learned to detect the "false bottom" in the sales pitches of destroy-
ers of sound estate plans.
There are two types of salesmen-creative and destructive. In
the financial field, the creative salesman, whether in life insurance,
banking, securities, real estate, or any other, assists the client in
building an estate through some form of saving or investing. This
requires that the individual refrain from spending all that he earns,
so that an estate will be created for the future.
The destructive salesman, unable to perform this constructive
function, attempts to destroy what has been created through the
efforts of others, so that he may feed, via commissions on his sales,
on the transfer of funds from some other form of property which
actually may better serve the individual's needs than that which
he is selling.
In order for a salesman to receive a commission he must receive
money for whatever he is selling. Salesmen of real estate, automo-
biles, television sets, and other tangibles or consumer goods fre-
quently rely on credit, so that the salesman receives his commission
immediately, whereas the buyer pledges a portion of his future
income.
Salesmen of thrift plans, investments, or speculations have a
somewhat different problem. To invest there must be cash to invest,
and there are currently rules against speculation on credit, based
on the valuable lessons of past experience.
The principal "replacers" today are some mutual funds salesmen,
frequently posing as "financial planners," "financial advisors," or
"financial analysts." To find the money on which to receive com-
missions for what they are selling they seek: (a) bank accounts,
(b) real estate, or (c) life insurance.
Inasmuch as bank accounts are generally guaranteed, and as
mutual funds contain no guarantees as to either principal or inter-
est, the contrast here is too great and few people are inclined to
sacrifice their savings. Therefore bank accounts are a relatively
unproductive source of funds.
2 Milwaukee Sentinel, April 26, 1874.
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Similarly, although many people own real estate, usually their
homes, few indeed are inclined to mortgage or sell such property
to provide funds for securities over which they have little or no
control.
And so the attack of some mutual funds salesmen is directed
against life insurance, and for several reasons. First, many people
are not as well informed as they should be about their life insur-
ance. They do not know how a "life" policy differs from a "term"
policy, and how the reserves in their policies are necessary to
maintain lifetime protection at a premium guaranteed not to
increase.
Second, the mutual funds salesmen have dusted off the thread-
bare "buy term and invest the difference" argument, referred to
earlier in the "false bottom" analogy. With seemingly low rate (but
in the long run high cost) policies, often issued by "captive" com-
panies unable to compete effectively in underwriting insurance
providing coverage for the whole of life, they proceed on a cam-
paign of destruction.
They are frequently aided and abetted in this by propaganda
books or articles written by other mutual funds salesmen, posing as
"financial planners," or even presuming to advise on how to avoid
the legal procedures of probate by adopting boilerplate trust instru-
ments which divert estate monies into mutual funds.
The purpose of the balance of this article is to analyze and expose
the errors, misrepresentations, and derogations employed by sales-
men who use these destructive tactics. In the process, if the
fundamentals of legal reserve life insurance are not already fully
understood-and we cannot assume that they are, or many of the
tragic errors we have seen would not have been committed-then
it will be necessary to learn them.
II. REPLACEMENT
Is TERm INSURANCE CHEAPER?
The first step in the replacement process is the contention that
the owner of whole life insurance is being overcharged. Usually
this is combined with an attempt to derogate the life underwriter,
so that he will be shunned as a source of information. 3 The conten-
tion is made that term insurance is cheaper.
3 Examples of Current Attacks on the Life Insurance Agent-And the
Fallacies inherent in them: Consumers Reports, January 1967: "[M]ost
families are under insured. They need not be .... They are talked
into buying a combination of life insurance plus savings account.
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As with many falsehoods, there is an element of truth in this
one. It can scarcely be called a "half-truth," for the possibility of
its being truthful is considerably less than 50 percent, but it must
be conceded that for the person who dies in the very early years
term insurance is, or in these instances has been, cheaper.
The most widely sold policy, ordinary or straight life, is just such
a combination. In one well-known company's rate list, a $10,000 ordi-
nary life policy calls for $135 a year in premiums for a man who
takes it out at age 25. For the same price and from the same com-
pany he could buy as much as $36,000 of pure insurance on a five-
year renewable term policy."
Then, in the February issue, Consumers Reports published their
proposed solutions, "lower-premium 5-year renewable term insurance
and a separate savings or investment program" involving the identical
outlay as the whole life policy.
Apparently, when in their January issue Consumers Reports
blamed the agent for talking the customer into whole life insurance,
instead of the $36,000 of term insurance, they did not know they
were going to contradict themselves in their February issue! For if
the customer uses all of the $135.00 for term insurance, where is he
going to get "the difference" to invest, per their February recommen-
dation? And if he does follow their February recommendation, then
he does not have any more insurance than he had under the recom-
mendation of the agent, whom they criticized! They obviously feel
that their readers have short memories.A recent book THE MORTALITY MERcHANTS, by a mutual funds
salesman, has in the introduction the sad story-real or hypothetical-
of two young men, each age 25 when he had bought insurance. The
first young man paid $363.80 a year and had $20,000 of insurance;
the second paid $362.44 and had reducing term insurance. Both young
men, by coincidence, had the misfortune to die at age 27, the second
"the victim of a highway crash" according to the author. The agent
of the first man was severely criticized for having sold "the policy
that was best for the agent and the insurance company." The second
man had, according to the author, the "rare good fortune of finding
the right agent, [and] had bought a contract that gave the agent and
company a fair profit..." and yet resulted in a claim for $105,000.
Just where the "profit" arose, in either of these transactions, for
total premiums of some $725.00, is a bit obscure. As any thinking
person knows, no insurance transaction can be judged by the extremely
long shot possibilities outlined here. The first man had life insurance
which would provide long range coverage; the second had decreasing
term which would be guaranteed to expire completely, and without
value, long before his normal expectancy. However, if we are to judge
results by hindsight, the second agent was not the "hero" pictured
by the author. In the light of what happened, he should not have
sold term insurance; he really should have sold only accidental death
insurance, the cost of which should be no more than $1.00 per thou-
sand at age 25. On the author's basis of hindsight, widow No. 2
could have had approximately $362,000 of death benefits instead of
the $105,000 of term insurance, so by the author's logic this agent
deprived the widow of over $250,000!
If our foresight could only equal our hindsight, particularly in
hypothetical illustrations!
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So, as far as practical advice is concerned, if the buyer is "cer-
tain"--or even has a "strong premonition"-that his death is immi-
nent, then it would be logical to urge his purchase of term insur-
ance, and at as low a rate as possible.
As a matter of actual fact, there is a strong element of what is
called "adverse selection" employed by the purchasers of insurance
and annuities. Those who think they are going to die soon try to
buy the cheap term plans. Thus all companies experience less favor-
able mortality under term insurance than under permanent insur-
ance plans. Therefore, they must charge more.
Even with paying the higher mortality costs necessarily built
into term insurance plans, the buyer will be better off with them
if he can be certain that he will be among those fortunate enough
to die, and thus have his claim paid, within the limited period for
which term insurance is effective.
For those tempted to rely on term insurance-but not being
among those certain of early death-it might be of interest to have
at least a basic acquaintance with the probabilities of death within
a specified period.
The mortality table,4 on which the "non-forfeiture values" of
most modern life insurance is based, indicates the following as the
percent of those living at any age that die within a given period:
Age 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 30 Years 40 Years
25 1.00% 2.11% 5.50% 12.99% 28.98%
35 1.41% 3.47% 11.12% 27.45%
45 3.17% 7.93% 24.85%
55 7.59% 18.37%
60 11.67%
Most term insurance expires at or before age 65. If it is decreas-
ing term insurance there is little if any protection left at age 65.
Even if the actual deaths among insureds in a given company fol-
lowed the mortality table, it will be seen that the chance of death
before age 65 is only about one in four. Stated differently, the
probability of survival beyond age 65-or beyond the time when
term insurance is likely to furnish any appreciable measure of pro-
tection-is thus about three out of four.
It is important to note again that the mortality table used by
any company for computations of policy non-forfeiture values does
not necessarily bear any close relationship to the actual incidence
of deaths within that company. A company which is "selective" in
4 1958 C.S.O. (Commissioners Standard Ordinary) Mortality Table
(National Assoc. of Insurance Commissioners 1958).
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its acceptance of risks can usually achieve an actual mortality ex-
perience much more favorable than indicated by the table. In a
mutual company these "mortality savings" are returned to policy-
owners in the form of dividends which thus reduce their insurance
costs. In the company with which I am associated, to be specific,
mortality savings represent $68 million, or 40 percent of the $169
million in dividends to be returned in 1969.5 Thus an insured indi-
vidual, who has been accepted by a selective company, although
not able to predict his own individual date of death, at least has
the satisfaction of knowing that he is a member of a group which
has considerably less chance of dying within the periods indicated
above than is shown by the mortality table figures.
Consequently, we shall consider primarily the interests of those
who are not certain that they will die within the early years, but
who are interested in life insurance which will provide: (1) ade-
quate protection if they should be among those who die prema-
turely, and (2) reasonable cost if they should survive to "normal"
expectancy.
What are the specific devices used by the replacers, and which
constitute misrepresentations? At least four are combined in one
proposal currently being used in a number of states by mutual
funds salesmen who are also licensed by one or more companies
which. specialize in the sale of decreasing term insurance in con-
junction with mutual funds. These, which we will discuss sepa-
rately, are:
1. The "Three Mortality Tables"
2. The failure to take dividends into consideration
3. The failure to take cash value increases into consideration
4. The use of a fallacious and misleading "cost" formula
SPECIFIc DEVICES USED IN REPLACEMENT6
The Three Mortality Tables
The first page of one of these proposals consists of three mortal-
ity tables.7 Although a mortality table is a record of the number
5 The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, Annual Report,
1968.
6 In the accompanying exhibits the author is interested in providing
the authenticity of actual documents, submitted in specific replace-
ment proposals, but not necessarily identifying the individual agents
or distributors who are merely symptomatic of a current trend. For
this reason, Exhibits A through D are reproductions of actual docu-
ments. Only the individual identification of agents and companies
using this material has been deleted. The additional markings and
writing on the documents are those of the agent using the material.
7 See Exhibit A infra at 937.
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of deaths, per thousand of insured individuals, which may be antici-
pated at the various ages, one of these tables is headed by a dollar
sign, with the figures at age 35 marked: $8.95 under the first table
(American Experience Table), $4.59 under the second (1941 Com-
missioners Standard Ordinary Table) and $2.51 under the third
(1958 Commissioners Standard Ordinary Table).
There is no printed comment explaining the significance of the
three tables or the reason for including them in the proposal.
Now, there is not anything necessarily illegal or unethical about
publishing mortality tables; they are in the public domain. If, how-
ever, they are accompanied by any verbal sales talk to the effect
that the owner of insurance, especially in a mutual life insurance
company, is being overcharged by reason of the mortality table
indicated in the reserve basis section of his existing insurance, then
this is a misrepresentation.
Each company, stock or mutual, uses its own mortality assump-
tions for the computation of its premium rates. The sole purpose of
the standard mortality tables of which those in Exhibit A are exam-
ples, specified from time to time by the state insurance regulatory
authorities, is for the calculation of non-forfeiture values. These are
the guaranteed cash, extended insurance, and paid-up insurance
values that are available to every owner of whole life or endow-
ment insurance (as distinguished from term insurance), in event it
should be either necessary or desirable to discontinue premiums.
In a mutual life insurance company, its actual mortality experi-
ence is compared annually with the assumptions applying to each
group of policies at each age at issue. To the extent that its actual
mortality is more favorable-as is almost always the case in a well
managed company employing sound underwriting practices-the
mortality gains become an important source of dividends to policy-
owners.
Thus the assumed mortality is immaterial. If a mutual company
experienced an actual mortality charge of $2.00 per thousand, at age
35, for example, and if it had assumed the figures indicated in the
tables printed, its mortality gains for that year available for divi-
dends to policyowners age 35 would thus be $6.95, $2.59 and $.51,
respectively, depending on the table in their respective policies.
The use of these three tables in a proposal raises a strong infer-
ence that they are intended to disparage policies which have been
in force for a number of years, when the more conservative mortal-
ity tables were in use. As we have seen, in a mutual life insurance
company the owner's actual mortality costs are adjusted, through
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dividends, to the actual experience of the company, so the specific
mortality table used for computation of the non-forfeiture values
is immaterial. Consequently, the use of the three mortality tables
in a replacement sales talk in an attempt to disparage a policy in a
mutual company would constitute a misrepresentation.
Failure to Take Dividends into Consideration
There are two general types of life insurance companies operat-
ing side by side in the United States and Canada: stock and mutual.
Both deal in long range contracts, which may provide benefits for
well over a hundred years. For example, an individual might pur-
chase insurance in his youth, die in old age, and have benefits paid
in the form of a life income to grandchildren. Both types of compa-
nies thus provide unconditional guarantees which are not available
from any other type of financial institution. Specifically, although
it may be possible elsewhere to get guarantees (not, however, in-
volving life contingencies) based on money invested currently, a
life insurance company provides guarantees both as to principal and
interest based on money to be paid to it many years into the future,
and income payments beyond.
Certainly no living individual, including life insurance company
top management, is able to forecast precisely the conditions of mor-
tality, interest, and expense which will apply many years into the
future. Best judgment by actuaries is used, and a safety margin
is included for the protection of the company, which is highly desir-
able for both the insureds and the owners. This leads us to the
essential difference between stock and mutual companies.
In the former, which are corporations organized for the profit
of their owners, the insureds and the stockholders are separate indi-
viduals. To the extent that a company is able to furnish the benefits
stipulated in its policies at less cost than provided by the premiums,
the profits belong, and quite properly so, to the stockholders who
have supplied the venture capital.
In the latter, there are no stockholders, and each policyowner
owning participating insurance is a part owner of the company, in
the relationship which his insurance bears to the whole. Because
of the annual adjustment of costs, by way of dividends, the initial
premiums charged by mutual companies are of relatively little sig-
nificance. They tend to be a bit higher than those for non-partici-
pating policies (policies which by definition do not participate in
the divisible surplus of the company) issued by the stock companies,
and which cannot be raised or lowered. This slightly higher pre-
mium provides the margin for safety in the mutual companies
which the stockholders' capital investment provides in the stock
companies.
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Although the dividends of mutual companies obviously cannot
be guaranteed, for by definition they adjust actual costs to future
conditions, they can be illustrated quite accurately based on assump-
tions of a continuation of interest, mortality, and expense factors
existing as of the date of purchase. Furthermore, the records of
actual dividend performance are readily available in several stand-
ard reference manuals,8 so that the prospective buyer is able to
appraise the relative performance of the various companies.
For all of these reasons, the insurance laws or regulations of
many states9 require that in any comparison involving participating
life insurance, dividends must be taken into consideration.
The so-called analysis form used by agents of some companies
that specialize in decreasing term insurance used with mutual funds
originally had no space even to record dividends (Exhibit B).10 A
later version has the space but, as will be noted (Exhibit C),11 the
agent usually fills in the space with the word "unavailable." As a
matter of fact, dividend information is available, either from the
policyowner as to the current dividend, or from the issuing com-
pany as to the current scale of dividends. The misleading effect of
the failure to take dividends into consideration will be shown later,
as applied to specific cases.12
8 FLITCRAFT COMPEND. (A.M. Best Co.); LITTLE GEm MANuAL (The Na-
tional Underwriter Co.); UNIQUE MANUAL DIGEST (The National
Underwriter Co.).
9 Representative of these laws or regulation: N.Y. INS. LAW § 127(2)
(McKinney 1966); Nebraska Department of Insurance, Department
Rule No. 32, effective March 1, 1969.
In California under a pronouncement issued in 1961 in a monthly
report to the Governor, the Insurance Commissioner stated: "[A]
member of the public is entitled to a fair, complete and impartial
comparison of all factors that would be pertinent to his decision.
When participating insurance is to be compared, a full presentation
of the anticipated dividends on both the new insurance and the
existing insurance is essential to a fair comparison. The failure, or
lack of ability, by the agent to furnish figures essential to a fair
comparison may not be excused by an oral disclaimer to the prospect
that pertinent facts or figures are not provided.... If the agent is
unable to make a full disclosure and a fair comparison of all perti-
nent facts and figures he should refrain from soliciting the prospect
to change insurance." This position was reconfirmed by the California
Insurance Department in a letter to the author on June 28, 1968.
10 See Exhibit B infra at 938.
11 See Exhibit C infra at 939.
12 The magnitude of the misrepresentations in ignoring dividends can
be quickly appreciated-if the reader will pardon a personal refer-
ence-by reference to just a few of the author's own policies: Prem-
ium $200.20; Dividend $110.81. Premium $418.50; Dividend $203.20.
Premium $510.30; Dividend $203.30, etc. Incidentally, the increase in
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The Failure to Take Cash Value Increases Into Consideration
The company issuing term insurance is concerned only with
early deaths. If the insured survives the term period, as most do,
the company's only outgo is for its expenses. In contrast, the com-
pany issuing whole life insurance, which is a unilateral contract
cancellable by the insured but not by the company, knows that if
the insured elects to continue the contract the company must pay
the claim eventually. The only question is when. The company cre-
ates an increasing reserve against this day of ultimate payment.
What is important to understand, however, is that this reserve is
the property of the company and that the insurance is the full face
amount of the policy and not the face amount minus the reserve as
is sometimes erroneously contended.
In the early days of life insurance, both in England and the
United States, there were no cash values even in whole life policies.
The companies had to create the reserves against the day of ulti-
mate payment of the claim, but in event of termination of premiums
prior to death the result was the complete forfeiture by the insured
of any internal values created.
This led to some unfortunate situations. As individuals became
old or disabled, many were unable to continue paying premiums,
with the result that they risked losing their insurance when they
needed it most. In England, auction sales took place where the life
insurance policies of unfortunate individuals, possibly near death,
were sold to the highest bidder. Thus the person, possibly desper-
ately ill, could at least recover something even though the profes-
sional speculator reaped the gain at the insured's death.
As a result of this rather gruesome situation Elizur Wright, who
was to become the first Insurance Commissioner of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, pioneered in requiring that all life (as
distinguished from term) insurance policies contain a table of guar-
anteed non-forfeiture values.13 Thus the insured would not be de-
prived of insurance protection in time of emergency, or if he wished
to terminate the insurance he would be able to recover a reasonable
portion of the insurance company's reserve, no longer needed be-
cause of the termination.
cash value of this latter policy was $650.40 this past year-so the
omission of either the dividend or the cash value increase would quite
obviously constitute "a material misrepresentation."
13 For an excellent treatment of Elizur Wright's Studies & Reports see
Tim BIBLE OF L= INsURAnCE (The American Conservation Company,
Chicago, Ill. 1932).
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This was the origin of cash and loan values in whole life policies.
Such values were an outgrowth and by-product of the legal reserve
required to maintain the integrity of the contract, and they do not
in any way add to the cost of the life insurance coverage. However,
inasmuch as they represent property values, available to the insured
either as collateral, or as cash in event of termination, they must
be taken into consideration in any objective analysis, for determin-
ing insurance costs.
Specific Misrepresentations as to Cost of Insurance
Two samples illustrate the type of misrepresentations currently
extant. The first (Exhibit B) 14 purports to be an analysis of a retire-
ment income policy issued by the Provident Mutual Life Insurance
Company. The second (Exhibit C)'15 purports to be a policy analysis
of a graduated premium life policy issued by the Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance Company.
Observe that there is no space to record the essential dividend
or cash value information on the Provident Mutual policy. Note
the technique used and the ridiculous costs developed. At age 57,
for example, the premium is shown as $2,381.76. Interest at 5% on
the then cash value, amounts to $1,366.20. "Total Cost" is thus
$3,747.96. No deduction is made for the dividend, which would be
substantial. Nor is any deduction made for the increase in cash
value for that policy year, which almost undoubtedly exceeds the
amount of the premium paid. As a result the ridiculous figure of
$3,747.96 is produced as a "Total Cost."
Then the distortion is compounded. Although $33,260 is stated as
the face amount and would be paid at death, the exaggerated cost is
divided by the face amount minus the reserve on the fallacious as-
sumption that the "insurance" is only this amount. The result is the
completely ridiculous and distorted figure of $631.40 per thousand!
The cash value at age 65 is shown as $53,482.08. No mention is
made of the fact that since this is a retirement income policy this
would also be the death benefit at age 65. Had the "protection" been
$1,000.00 at age 65, instead of zero, it would have been of interest to
see the salesman attempt to convince the client that he was really
paying $5,055.86 per thousand for his insurance protection!
This is an extreme but actual example of the heights of incre-
dulity to which this fallacious formula can lead the ignorant or
unscrupulous salesman.
14 See Exhibit B infra at 938.
15 See Exhibit C infra at 939.
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In Exhibit C, accurate dividend and cash value information will
be supplied which will considerably change the eight year "Cost per
Thousand."
The analysis states that the eight year cost is $27.50 per thousand.
This is developed by taking the "basic premium" of $513.00, ignor-
ing the dividend as "Unavailable," adding a so-called "interest
factor" of 5% on the April 6, 1968, cash value, this being $112.61
bringing the total cost (not shown as such in the illustration) to
$625.61. Dividing $625.61 by the "protection" of $22,747.75, produces
the figure of $27.50 "per thousand" as the eighth year cost.
Now to correct the errors and misrepresentations. First, the
dividend of $141.00 is available, and was in fact used to reduce the
1968 premium. Therefore, the net outlay for the life insurance for
the current policy year was $372.00 (not $513.00).
The cash value as of April 6, 1968, was $2,252.25. The guaranteed
cash value as shown in the policy will be $2,701.75 on April 6, 1969.
Thus the guaranteed increase in cash value, for the year, is $449.50
($2,701.75-$2,252.25).
If the insured had the cash value of $2,701.75 invested at 5% net
after taxes, the hypothetical "interest factor" would be $135.09.
The net premium payment of $372.00 plus the interest factor of
$135.09 totals $507.09. The guaranteed cash value increase of $449.50
must be subtracted, leaving the total eighth year cost as $57.59.
Dividing $57.59 by $25,000, the face value of the insurance, gives a
cost per thousand of $2.30, not $27.50.
The distortion and misrepresentation is obvious.
The Fallacies in the State of Washington Replacement Formula.
In 1968 the State of Washington adopted a replacement regula-
tion 8 requiring the completion of a comparison of costs for the first,
fifth and tenth years. The comparison must follow the format stated
in the regulation, and does take dividends and cash value increases
into consideration. As a tool to prevent misrepresentations of the
type discussed earlier, it has merit. However, the formula as
adopted contains certain inconsistencies and does not accomplish
one of its stated objectives of providing a more meaningful basis
for comparison of relative company costs.
16 Washington State Administrative Regulation, WAC 284-30-010 (Insur-
ance Commissioner's Administrative Order R-68-1).
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Possibly the best way to illustrate this is by an actual example,
using three stock companies which issued $10,000 non-participating
Ordinary Life policies in 1949.17 Data is from the 1949 Flitcraft
Compend,'8 a recognized industry compendium.
Company A Company B Company C
Annual Premium $222.40 $220.50 $223.00
Assuming the insured were interested only in death benefits,
which company is providing the "lowest cost" insurance? Obvi-
ously, Company B is.
But suppose the insured were also interested in cash values in
the event of surrender, and a retrospective look at comparative life
insurance costs. Viewed in 1968, comparative costs would be:
Company A Company B Company C
Premiums Paid, 1949-1968 $4448 $4410 $4460
Cash Value, 1968 3460 3320 3410
Net cost (without allowance
for interest) $ 988 $1090 $1050
In retrospect, the coverage in Company A shows the lowest
"surrender cost."
However, what conclusions would be reached under the Wash-
ington formula? The following shows the steps set forth in the
"Program Analysis Method" of that State:19
Company A Company B Company C
1. Face Amount $10,000.00 $10,000.00 $10,000.00
2. Cash Value, end of policy year 3,460.00 3,320.00 3,410.00
3. Amount at risk 6,540.00 6,680.00 6,590.00
4. Annual Premium 222.40 220.50 223.00
5. Annual Dividend none none none
6. Increase in Cash Value for Pol. Yr. 194.00 194.00 198.00
7. Interest on Cash Value-Percent
(in policy) 2%% 2 /4% 2 %
Amount (of interest) 86.50 91.30 85.25
8. Annual Cost of Risk (4)-(5)-(6) + (7) 114.90 117.80 110.25
9. Cost per $1,000 of Risk (8) - (3) 17.57 17.64 16.73
Thus we see that, in this instance, Company C, which has the
highest premium, is portrayed by the Washington formula as fur-
17 The identities of these companies are not important, but are avail-
able on request from the author.
Is FLITCRAFT COMPEND. (Flitcraft, Inc. 1949).
19 Program Analysis Method, Attachment A-2, Washington State
Administrative Regulation, WAC 284-30-010 (Insurance Commis-
sioner's Administrative Order R-68-1).
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nishing the lowest cost life insurance! Moreover, Company B which
has the lowest premium of the three is pictured as furnishing the
highest cost life insurance!
As will be noted by comparing the interest charged against
Companies A and C above (which have the identical 21/2% rate of
interest assumed in their reserve basis), the Company (C) with the
lower cash value receives the benefit of the lower interest charge.
Even though its premium may be higher, as it is in this instance, it
may be portrayed as furnishing lower cost insurance.
Under this approach, if the management of a company holds
back more of the reserve, rather than paying it in surrender values
to the policyholders who terminate, the cost of the insurance to
the policyowner is portrayed as being reduced. In a world "where
ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise!'" Similarly when providing
low nonforfeiture values in a policy is pictured as a virtue, by rea-
son of a discriminatory formula, it is indeed folly to offer to the
buyer a policy contract with high cash values!
It will be seen, however, that even more important than the cash
values as an influence on "annual cost," under the Washington
formula, is the rate of interest applied against the cash value. The
rules say that, for non-participating policies, the rate in the reserve
basis section of the policy will be used. In the Company A-B-C
comparison above, it will be seen that Company B assumes a 23
percent rate. Although it has a lower cash value, the application of
the higher interest rate boosts its interest charge to $91.30 and re-
sults in its being shown as the "highest cost" of these three com-
panies, when actually it has the lowest premium!
The discrimination is even more apparent when a participating
policy is involved because the Washington regulation requires that
for all participating insurance-unlike non-par, where the policy
rate applies-a 4% rate will be used. Generally a participating
policy will have much lower net premiums after a period of years,
and will show up well under the Washington formula in spite of the
higher charges arbitrarily assessed. However, to illustrate the dis-
criminatory effect of the different rate of interest applying to
"nonparticipating" vs. "participating" assume that the policy in
Company C, above (portrayed under the formula as the lowest cost
company of the three) was a participating policy and that all other
factors were the same, except that 4% interest applied, as it must
for all participating policies under the Washington regulation.
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Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3
Company C Company C Company C
As it is, If it Assumed If it Were
2Y% 4%
Non-Par Non-Par Participating
1. Face Amount $10,000.00 $10,000.00 $10,000.00
2. Cash Value, end of Pol. Yr. 3,400.00 3,410.00 3,410.00
3. Amount at Risk 6,590.00 6,590.00 6,590.00
4. Annual Premium 223.00 223.00 223.00
5. Annual Dividend none none 51.15
6. Increase in Cash Val. for Pol. Yr. 198.00 198.00 198.00
7. Interest on Cash Value-Percent 2%% 4% 4%
-Amount 85.25 136.40 136.40
8. Annual Cost of Risk (4)-(5)-(6) + (7) 110.25 161.40 110.25
9. Cost per $1,000 of Risk (8) - (3) 16.73 24.49 16.73
By comparing Column 2 with Column 1, above, it will be seen
how it may be made to appear that the cost per thousand of insur-
ance varies from $16.73 to $24.49-a difference of $7.76 per thousand,
or almost 50%--depending merely on whether the company re-
ceives the favorable "policy guarantee" rate on most older stock
company policies, or whether it is charged with the 4% rate re-
quired for all participating policies, regardless of the rate assumed
in their reserve basis.
Column 3 illustrates how much the dividend would have to be
under a participating policy (charged with the compulsory 4%
rate) to have it show up with the same purported per thousand cost
as applies to a non-par policy under the Washington formula. If
the policy were participating, even with the same premium, it
would have to return a dividend of $51.15, or 22.9% of its premium
and show a net outlay of only $171.85, or 77% of the non-par pre-
mium, to have it appear under the Washington formula that its net
per thousand cost was equal to that of the non-participating policy.
How long can discrimination of this type, in a formula purporting
to furnish the buyer with a more meaningful understanding of life
insurance costs, go unchallenged?
No single, double, or triple year cross section of the type utilized
in these formulas can provide any sound, realistic or fair pictures
of either actual or relative company costs. They provide a figure,
but the figure standing alone is meaningless.
If the purpose of the interest charge is to take into consideration
the earnings which the policyowner could be receiving on outside
investment, then obviously there is no reason whatever for a differ-
ent rate, applying arbitrarily in favor of stock companies, or against
mutuals, as is the effect of the Washington regulation.
Even if this were eliminated by requiring a uniform interest
rate for all companies, the fallacy of favoring the policy with the
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lower cash value would still remain. It is obvious that a great need
exists for education and understanding.
THE INFLATION SALES PITCH.
The author does not contend that there has not been inflation
in the past, nor indeed that there may not be inflation in the future.
That is not the point of this article which deals with misrepresenta-
tions linked to the replacement of life insurance.
The most common device illustrated as a measurement of "infla-
tion" is the Consumer Price Index (CPI), computed by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. This index, based on the "market basket" prin-
ciple, contains an element of distortion which in reality reflects
improved quality factors (higher medical costs for modern life
saving hospital and surgical techniques, for one example), so that
perhaps 40% of the increase in the CPI has been a reflection of the
increased cost of a higher standard of U.S. living, rather than reflec-
tion of a constant living scale. However, with due recognition of its
deficiencies, the CPI is a widely accepted device for emphasizing
the need for higher compensation, and it has also been used by the
detractors of life insurance with the inference that life insurance
has not "kept pace."
To illustrate, a reproduction of printed sales material currently
being used by a mutual fund sales organization is presented. (Ex-
hibit D) .20 The essence of this material is the contention that a loss
of 33.1% has occurred, due to the difference in purchasing power
of the dollar in 1967 as compared with 1947, the date of purchase of
the life insurance.
The statement is then made, in the footnote, that the results
illustrated are based on Non-Participating Ordinary Life and that
"Had a participating or mutual policy been shown in this illustra-
tion, the loss would have been magnified... Y
Experience with the printed materials employed by some mutual
funds salesmen who suggest or advise the replacement of existing
insurance has demonstrated the necessity of taking nothing for
granted.
A check of the facts produced the following.
The policy described in Exhibit D is a $50,000 Ordinary Life
policy issued in 1947 at an annual premium of $935 at age 35 and
with a 20th Year Cash Value of $16,250.
20 See Exhibit D infra at 940.
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Although it is possible to buy such a policy today at about these
rates, a search of the 1947 standard industry reference manuals
showed no company then offering such a policy at the rate printed
in this sales material.
The prospectus states the name of the insurance company used
in the hypothetical illustration.
The 1947 issue of the Unique Manual Digest,21 a standard refer-
ence manual, shows the rates of this company in 1947, for Ordinary
Life, age 35, as $22.24 per $1,000, or $1,112.00; not $935.00 as stated-
for a $50,000 policy. The 20th year cash value is shown as $310 per
thousand, or $15,500-not $16,250, as stated-for a $50,000 policy.
So the first point in documenting the misrepresentations in this
material is that the premium charged by the affiliated company is
understated by $177.00 a year, or $3,540 over the twenty years in
question, and the cash value overstated by $750.00, for a total error
of $4,290.00. This is quite apart from the inflation loss argument
which will now be explored.
The point is made that, by reason of the change in the consumer
price index, a 33.1% loss has occurred. However, if the purchasing
power of the proceeds (had death occurred in 1967 instead of 1947)
is 33.1% less than it would have been, it follows that the purchasing
power of the premiums paid over the twenty years has also been
less. Gain or loss must be related to the premiums.
To demonstrate the misrepresentation, two sets of calculations
were made with respect to a $50,000 non-participating policy in the
life insurance company with which this mutual fund organization
is identified. (Exhibit E) 22
The first set of calculations involved the hypothetical assump-
tion that there had been no change whatever in the consumer price
index over this 20-year period. In that event, $50,000 of 1967 pro-
ceeds would still represent $50,000 of 1947 buying power, and pre-
mium dollars paid would have been worth $1.00 throughout. This
exhibit shows that had death occurred in 1947, the proceeds ($50,000)
would have been 45.0 times the premium ($1,112) paid. In the event
of death in 1967 the proceeds ($50,000) would have been 2.248 times
the sum of 20 premiums ($22,240) paid.
The second set of calculations converts all dollars, premiums
paid and hypothetical proceeds paid, into terms of buying power
21 UNIQUE MANUAL DIGEST (National Underwriter Co. 1947).
22 See Exhibit E infra at 941.
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units, based on the consumer price index. On this basis, the ratio
of proceeds paid to premiums would be identical in 1947, but in
1967 would have been a multiple of 1.905 times premiums paid.
This is 84.7% of what would have been paid in terms of buying
power, had the consumer price index remained constant Hence,
the loss, if by loss is meant a gain of less than was originally antici-
pated, is 15.3%, and not 33.1% as contended in the sales material
(Exhibit D).
Moreover, there is another misrepresentation. Recall the sales
material stated that under a participating or mutual policy "the loss
would have been magnified."
The identical process outlined above was repeated. But based
on an ordinary life policy issued by the mutual company with
which the author is associated, and for which the actual record of
dividend payments during these 20 years (Exhibit F)23 is available.
One of the effects of inflation has been to increase interest rates.
This has increased dividends to policyowners, thereby reducing
insurance costs on the ordinary life policy illustrated in Exhibit F
by $1,465.00.
The exhibit shows that the purchasing power of the premiums
paid under the illustrated policy is $19,436 in terms of constant
Consumer Price Index dollars, as compared with $23,203 for the
non-participating policy. Adjusting the purchasing power of the
proceeds to Consumer Price Index dollars, the multiple of death
benefits to cumulative Consumer Price Index premiums is 2.275
times, based on the actual results under the participating policy.
The exhibit shows that even after adjusting for inflation, the
illustrated participating policy produced a higher multiple (2.275)
of death benefits to premiums paid than did the non-participating
policy (2.248) without any adjustment for inflation. Therefore, the
statement in the sales material that "the loss would have been mag-
nified" under a participating policy-at least as actually issued by
the Northwestern Mutual, and doubtless other leading mutuals as
well-is erroneous and a further misrepresentation.
WHAT IS THE COST OF LIE INSURANCE?
Unfortunately there has been a lot of fuzzy thinking on this
subject, even within the life insurance industry, and when coupled
with some completely fallacious and distorted cost formulas it is no
wonder that the public is confused.
23 See Exhibit F infra at 942.
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It is relatively easy, as has been demonstrated, to point out the
fallacies in cost formulas which would divide the life insurance
contract into two parts, and then attribute the costs of the whole,
including an interest factor, against one part of the contract, to
arrive at a "one year cost." Obviously no one year cost analysis
can properly portray the actual cost of life insurance, and formulas
which attempt to do so merely compound confusion.
If these formulas are fallacious, then does the public not have
a right to inquire as to what is a proper measurement of cost? In-
deed it does. But the answer is not as simple as stating the cost of
consumer goods. Part of the confusion results from calling a life
insurance contract a "product," which it is not.
Rather, life insurance is a unique financial service, being an un-
conditional promise to pay a guaranteed amount at death, whenever
that death shall occur. One of the reasons that cost is so hard to
pin down is that even in the same company, and under the same
policy contract, issued at the same age, the cost in relation to the
benefits will vary as between individuals, depending on the very
thing that is being insured, the length of that individual life.
Does this mean that it is impossible to arrive at a meaningful
measurement of costs, which will demonstrate the very real differ-
ence in values furnished by different companies? No, it does not,
but it does mean that a sound basis upon which to measure cost
must be established. Is cost to be defined as the cost if you die (and
if so at what date), or as the cost if you live (and if so for what
period)? Part of the problem is semantics, but if the same rules of
common sense are applied to life insurance as are applied to the
ownership of other forms of property, there should be no difficulty.
A buys a house for $25,000 cash, lives in it for one year and dies.
B buys a house for $25,000 cash, lives in it for 25 years and dies. C
buys a house for $25,000 cash, lives in it for 20 years and sells it for
$20,000. What have been the costs of the respective houses to A, B,
and C? Disregarding for the moment the residual estate values, it
will be apparent that, whatever may be your measurement of cost,
each individual received different value depending on his relative
length of life, the factor which could not be forecast. So cost con-
fusion is not limited to life insurance.
A, age 20, buys a $100,000 non-participating life insurance policy
for a single premium of $25,000 and dies one year later, $100,000
being paid his widow. B, age 20, buys the identical policy for the
identical single premium, but dies at age 65, also with $100,000 pay-
able to his widow. C, age 20, buys the identical policy at the iden-
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tical premium, and at age 65, decides he no longer needs the
insurance. Consequently he surrenders it for its then cash value of
$68,000.
Despite identical policies in the same company taken out at the
same age, the cost for each has obviously varied greatly, due prin-
cipally to circumstances beyond anyone's control. Yet these are
the simplest of situations, involving the most basic form of insur-
ance, non-participating single premium life.
Consider D, who at age 20, purchases $100,000 of single premium
insurance in a mutual life insurance company.24 His premium
would be higher, to be sure: $27,248.90 to be exact, but he receives
annual cash dividends (current 1969 scale, not guaranteed) of
$354.00 the first year and increasing to $570.00 the 20th year and to
$1,122.00 at age 65. Assume that he dies at age 70, when $100,000 is
paid to his widow, in cash or income as elected.
Assume the same facts as above except that E elects to leave all
of his dividends with the company as fully paid-up additions to his
policy. When he dies the death benefit is a total of $216,000 (the
$100,000 basic policy, plus $116,000 of dividend additions).
Again assume the same facts as above, except that F elects to
leave dividends with the company, but at age 65, he decides to sur-
render his insurance coverage and use the cash value of $140,600
for a guaranteed lifetime annuity.
Once again, under the simplest form of policy, single premium
life (but, in these instances, on the participating plan) what is the
"cost" of the insurance to these three individuals, each of whom
purchased identical policies at the same age and at the same
premium?
WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY INSURANCE COSTS?
Whatever measurement of value is developed, it should be mean-
ingful to you, as the reader. How do you compute your automobile
insurance costs, for example? Do you consider just your annual
outlay? Do you compound your outlay at interest, year by year,
on the theory that if you did not carry the automobile insurance,
those funds would be available for productive investment? If so,
what rate of interest do you assume? Do you assume a claim? If so,
how much?
24 The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company.
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All forms of insurance involve compensation to the insurance
company for the taking of a risk. Life insurance, for the whole of
life, involves both a risk and a certainty, the risk of death in the
early years, the certainty of death in the later years and thus of
eventual payment.
Whole life insurance provides for either: (1) payment of the
face amount, upon death or maturity or (2) payment of the cash
value upon surrender. The amount of the cash surrender value in
relation to premiums paid will depend upon: (a) the type of policy
contract, (b) the length of time the coverage has been in force, and
(c) the differences in company performance.
It should be apparent why the answer to "actual costs" or "rela-
tive costs" is not a simple one.
COMPARING COSTS AS BETWEEN COMPAIES
The wide variations in "cost" or "value" applying to different
individuals insured by the same company, depending upon their
respective dates of death, have been shown. If the objective of our
study is to determine differences in cost as between companies,
ground rules must be established. Obviously the assumed time of
death must be a constant factor in every comparison. A choice
must be made between (a) identical amount of insurance, to deter-
mine differences in premiums, or cash values, or both, or (b) the
identical annual premium, to determine differences in death bene-
fits or cash values, or both.
It is essential also that comparable forms of policy contracts be
compared, such as whole life vs. whole life, 20 payment life vs. 20
payment life, etc. In an intercompany relative cost study, any
attempt to compare "term vs. whole life" or "whole life vs. endow-
ment," is bound to be confusing, and probably misleading as well.
For many years life insurance statistical services have published
net cost 25 comparisons. Such comparisons are usually of policies of
the same type, having generally similar gross premiums, and in-
volving contracts issued subject to the same policy minimum sizes.
They are based on either "Actual History of Performance" over a
comparable period of years or on "Current Scale of Dividend
Distribution."
25 The conventional "net cost" formula is: Gross Premiums multiplied
by "X" years, minus dividends over "X" year period = Net Payments.
Net Payments minus Cash Value at end of "X" years= Net Cost.
(PX - D - C = N).
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The former is exactly what it says, an actual record of perform-
ance over an identical period of time. The latter is an illustration
of results which may be anticipated in the future, based upon an
assumed continuation of conditions of interest, mortality and ex-
pense at the time of publication of the dividend scale.




Company A Company B Company C
2 Years $211.12
Gross Annl. Prem. $251.40 Thereafter 263.90 $263.90
Dividend Net Payment Dividend Net Payment Dividend Net Payment
1959 $30.60 $220.80 $25.00 $186.12 $47.20 $216.70
1960 34.40 217.00 29.30 181.82 51.70 212.20
1961 38.40 213.00 42.20 221.70 56.30 207.60
1962 42.30 209.10 47.80 216.10 62.70 201.20
1963 46.50 204.90 52.90 211.00 66.90 197.00
1964 50.60 200.80 65.60 198.30 75.40 188.50
1965 58.00 193.40 70.50 193.40 80.30 183.80
1966 62.60 188.80 77.70 186.20 90.40 173.50
1967 66.70 184.70 83.20 180.70 96.00 167.90
1968 71.50 179.90 88.80 175.10 111.30 152.60
Summary:
Actual Net
Payments $2,012.40 $1,950.40 $1,900.80
Average Annl.
Net Payt. 20.24 195.00 190.10
Cash Value 1,754.70 1,600.00 1,863.60
Net Cost 257.70 350.40 37.20
Avg. Net Cost
Per Yr. Per
Thousand 2.58 3.50 .37
The above study indicates that there has been a difference in
performance of these companies over the ten-year period of 1958-
1968.
Critics of the "net cost" comparison method state that it is
unfair because it does not take interest into consideration. For this
reason, they say, the net cost figure is not a true reflection of actual
cost to the buyer, and they contend that any meaningful cost analy-
sis should take interest into consideration, on the grounds that had
the money not been put into life insurance it could have been
invested elsewhere.
An answer to this criticism is that "net cost" was never intended
to illustrate actual costs to the buyer, but only relative cost differ-
26 Data obtained from FI.ICRAFT COMPEND. (A.M. Best Co. 1968).
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ences between companies, based on generally comparable contracts.
The same criticism-that "cost" does not include "interest"--could
be made about the cost of anything else that a person buys.
However, the life insurance company does earn interest on the
policy reserves, and this interest, to the extent that it exceeds the
assumed rate, is used to reduce the policyowner's insurance costs
through dividends. The higher the rate of interest earned on the
reserves (all else assumed equal), the lower the cost of participat-
ing insurance to the policyowner. If interest is to be considered in
a cost comparison, what rate of interest should be used?
Many contend that the gross rate chargeable should not be
higher than the guaranteed rate applicable to policy loans in the
contract, usually 5%, because if higher interest is obtainable else-
where the policyowner can borrow the cash value at 5% interest
and obtain the excess interest through the outside investment. If
interest is included as a cost factor, the income tax consequences
cannot be ignored. If a 30% income tax bracket is assumed fair,
this leaves a 3%% net after tax return to use in the hypothetical
calculations. In any event, if the primary objective is to determine
the relative differences in company performance, the interest rate
is almost immaterial.
Referring to the same three actual histories shown on page 47,
if net payments are compounded at 3 % for the ten-year period
the results are:2
Company A Company B Company C
1958 $ 354.62 $ 297.81 $ 372.26
1959 300.93 253.66 295.34
1960 285.75 239.42 279.42
1961 271.00 282.07 264.13
1962 257.05 265.65 247.34
1963 243.36 250.60 233.98
1964 230.42 227.55 216.30
1965 214.42 214.42 203.56
1966 202.24 199.46 185.85
1967 191.16 187.02 173.78
Total $2,550.95 $2,417.66 $2,471.96
Less 1968 Dividend 71.50 88.80 111.30
Payments Accum. at Interest $2,479.45 $2,328.86 $2,360.66
Cash Value 1,754.70 1,600.00 1,863.60
Net Cost $ 724.75 $ 728.86 $ 497.06
Average Net Cost Per Yr.
Per Thousand 7.25 7.29 4.97
27 A "compound interest" net cost formula might be expressed as:
"Annual Payments compounded at Interest for "X" years, minus
cash value =net cost. In this formula, inasmuch as dividends are
payable at the end of the policy year, the first year gross premium is
compounded, and the dividend payable at the end of the period under
consideration is subtracted, in arriving at the accumulated input.
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This formula doubtless provides a more accurate measurement
of total cost of the insurance than the net cost formula which does
not take interest into consideration. Note, too, that it avoids the
fallacies of the split contract approach criticized earlier because
(1) it is based on the entire face amount of insurance, and (2) it is
a cumulative figure, taking the full ten years performance into con-
sideration. However, as a relative measurement, the companies still
rank in the same order as under the simpler net cost approach.
Another relative ranking of company performance is one which
does not attempt to measure the cost of the insurance, but measures
the ratio of values within the policy in relation to actual premium
payments. This is known as the "Investment Quotient" (I.Q.), and
is arrived at by dividing the cash value by premiums paid, as
follows:
Ten Year 'iQ" Company A Company B Company C
Cash Values $1,754.70 $1,600.00 $1,863.60
Net Payments 2,012.40 1,950.40 1,900.80
Investment Quotient: 87.2% 82.0% 98.0%
This measurement device indicates that Company A after having
provided $10,000 of life insurance protection for ten years makes
cash values available to the policyowner equivalent to 87.2% of
premiums paid. Here again the ranking of the companies is the
same as under "net cost."
Probably the most informative measurement of relative values,
as between specific companies is a graphic technique, based on an
identical premium payment, constant over a reasonable period of
years, with death benefits and cash values measured separately.
This device is particularly appropriate for comparing non-par vs.
non-par, or participating vs. participating. If used to compare a
non-participating policy vs. a participating policy, it must be borne
in mind that the former, for a constant unit of premium, will gen-
erally provide a larger death benefit in the early policy years, when
term insurance is relatively inexpensive, whereas the latter will
normally provide the higher death benefit in the later years, when
term insurance is of course more expensive if, indeed, it is available
at any price.
III. CONCLUSION
Most of the problems dealing with either incomplete compari-
sons or misrepresentations arise where different types of policies in
different companies are "compared," with one being portrayed as
the better value.
As has been shown, there are cost differences between compa-
nies under similar types of policies. Because the premium for one
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is lower does not necessarily mean that lower cost life insurance is
being provided. It may mean that the low premium insurance will
reduce in amount, or expire altogether without value, while the
other insurance is still in effect. Consequently, any purported com-
parison of unlike contracts must be viewed critically to ascertain
whether the basis is objective, or whether it is slanted to favor the
point of view of the proponent. Extreme care must be taken when
these comparisons involve replacement of existing insurance, be-
cause of the incentive of commissions which will be received by the
replacer if he is successful.
Inasmuch as the owner of a participating policy in a mutual
company receives his insurance at cost, any inferences that within
a particular company one type of policy provides a "bargain"
whereas another involves an "overcharge," simply compounds con-
fusion. If responsible companies and responsible agents appear to
favor whole life over term plans it is probably because they know
the life insurance business well enough to know that the initially
low premiums of temporary insurance are all too frequently a delu-
sion. The vast majority of policyowners who carry term insurance
are in the position of the house renter vs. the home owner. The
former has a stack of rent receipts, but is at the mercy of the land-
lord as to future availability and costs. The latter has property
values and a choice of attractive options for the future.
In the past ninety years our increased knowledge should have
enabled us to detect "the false bottom" in the attempted compari-
son of unlikes. Nevertheless, the fact remains that otherwise well-
informed people still fall victim to the siren song of the replacer.
But when even some regulatory authorities adopt a system which
produces contradictory results, under the label of "clarification,"
who can really blame Mr. Average Citizen, subjected to persuasive,
but sometimes ill-informed or unprincipled salesmen, from failing
to detect "the false bottom."





.- r(-431858 a931-141 c[O50-19~)
Age Age
20 ......... $ 7.81 20
25 ...... ... 8.07- 25
30 ...... ... 8.43 30
35 . . . r 8.95 35
40 ...... ... 9.79 40
45 ...... ... 11.16 45
50 ...... ... 13.78 50
55 ...... .. 18.57 -55
60 ...... ... 26.69 60
65 ...... ... 40.13 65
70 ...... ... 61.99 70
75 ...... .. 94.37 75
80 ....... ... 144.47 80
85 ....... ... 235.55 85
90 ....... ... 454.55 90
95 ........ 1,OQO.00 95
Age
$ 2.43 20 ........ $ 1.79
2.88 25 ...... ... 1.93
3.56 30 ...... ... 2.134.59 35 . . .. .-- Z,51
6.18 40 ...... ... 3.53
8.61 45 ...... ... 5.35
12.32 50 ...... ... 8.32
17.98 55 ....... ... 13.00
26.59 60 ...... .. 20.34-
39.64 65 .. ... .-- 31.75 -
59.30 70 ....... ... 49.79
88.64 75 ....... ... 73.37
131.85 80 ...... 10998
194.13 85 . . . . . 1. "(14
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EXHIBIT B
Insured /Company Provident Mutual Life
Ooer Poltcy Number 2,015,827
Beneficiary. Mortality Table C.S.O. 1958 3%
Analysis Date
NON-FORFEITURE OPTIONS
Total Premium $2,474.22 Paid Up Ins. $5;379--
Acc. Death $ Cash Value




Basic Premium $ 2.38:76
Interest Factor $_J.15
Total Cost #.Z5L
Cost Per $1,000 S .15
20
'$2.381 .76 $ 2.38 176
$6$2,674,1o
Appendix "A forms a part of this analysis





ANALYSIS DATE April 6. 1968
Total Premium $ 521.00
Accidental Death S 0 -
Waiver of Premium 8.00
Current Dividend $ Unavailable
Basic Premium $ 513.00
Original Premium 161.50
$ 6.46 'Cost per Thousand at Inception
$9 27. 50 :Cost perThousand -!-Year
* Reducing Annual Cost
COMPANY Northwestern Mutual
POLICY NUMBER 5 211 574
MORTALITY TABLE CSO 1941
(2%)
NON-FORFEITURE OPTIONS
Paid Upinsurance $ 4,250.00
Cash Value $ 2,252.25
Protection $ 1,997.75
Extended Term $ 25,000.00
Peridod: 15 Years 5 Days
FACE AMOUNT $ 25,000.00
PROTECTION $ 22,747-75
$ 2,252.25 CASH VALUE
INTEREST FACTOR $ 112.61
Issue Date April 6, 1960 2033 Endowment Date
Issue Age 27 100 Endowment Age
Appendix "A" forms a part of this analysts
IMPORTANT: If this Pdlicy is participating, dividends may be used to:
A. Reduce Annual Premium
B. Left on deposit to accumulate Interest
C. Buy paid tip additions
AO.7749.A(3)
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The tollowing chart illustrates the adverse eact oflton io -the most common EM'h1 D
tifo Insuranc policy issued in the United States - Ordinary Life.
tnllallon is an economic ondilion that. in a general sense, cnnol be seen or felt
end most people are unaware at its devastating effect on their long range financial
plannnlg.
te evaluating which curse your insurance programming should take inthe future.
ash yourselt he questiun: "Will Inflation con!.nue to be a part of the economic
uture?" It. Ia your Opinlon. this will be the case. your most prdent course of action
may well be to develop your Insurance state around the use of term insurance.
Term Insurance provides maximum protection with Minimum oulay and eliminates
the use Of ttlthe or3. saving s element built into an Ordinary Life policy.
'The use of covertitblb term allows you to continue your Insurance coverage by
converting that policy to any number of available policies without evidence of
1 1947 $5O,00O Ordlnary Life' 1967
GCartimldfltarit
DEATH BENEFIT ..... $50.C0M
2Mr YEAR CASH VALUE ... I6.250
JAmalup $M011 tsl~g35)
PrulaVla, tolnent fPuubsLag porma
DEATHBENEI0 ............ $33.45D 33.1% LOW
CASH VALUE? .............. i$101
VALUE OFTHE DOLLAR
More Cost Per Premium
Based on Purchasing BOA Cents
.- a iidex 19411-1967
P",
1947 1957
.carcnionaaurwA omeaar org-c... n~5.oa. ., saiwur..... .u,..e.es,.. ,.wi...i.
- b.c. . vbs.d - r.ao muabi. .. am.. .. a. bb.. nic. .. mifl ii.. ma... mesi mm ira.m
THE EFFECT
OF INFLATION




ABUSES IN THE REPLACEMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE 941
EXHIBIT EAdjostmeot of the por~osreiog powrer of Life tnsoronco (promds in ement of e  end Ce.sh Vi C es) to plotoclog power of preoiums period "1947-.7. Consumers P.e clne,.€omplfed fry urn~eo f Lobe. stOaistics, 1957.-59 = 100 Soure.- Handbols of Bsic Ecoemle Statistics, 1968.$0,000 Winery Life, AS. 35, (Nlaorlt|iip'Wlng B-o) 1947- So=ce Unique Manual Digest, 1947.
I I Pue P-u. db.  o-
1 1947 $1112 $1112 $50000 44.964
2 1948 1112 2224 480 22.482
3 1949 1112 3336 000 14.988
4 1950 1112 4448 48000 11.241
5 1951 1112 5560 50000 B.993
6 1952 1112 6672 5000 7.494
7 1953 1112 7784 4000 6.423
8 1954 1112 8896 40000 5.620
9 1955 1112 10008 50000 A.996
10 1956 1112 1112D 5D000 4.496
11 1957 1112 12232 50000 4.08
12 1948 1112 13344 5000 3.747
13 1959 1112 4456 500 3.459
14 1960 1112 15568 4000 3.212
15 1961 1112 16680 5000 2.98
16 1962 1112 17792 4000 2.810
17 1963 1112 18904 5000 2645
18 1964 1112 2016 50000 2.493
19 1965 .1112 21123 5000 2.367
20 1966 1112 22240 48000 2.248
Conuor.s- Adjosrnd Vole. RoOld to C.P.I. slwrin Po ,
77.8 $1429 $ 1429 $44267 44.973
83.8 1327 2756 48666 21.649
83.0 1340 4096 60241 14.707
83.8 1327 5423 59666 11.002
90.5 1229 6652 55249 8.306
92.S 122 7854 54054 6.812
93.2 1193 9047 53648 5.930
93.6 1188 10235 53419 5.219
93.3 1192 11427 52591 4.690
94.7 1174 12601 52798 4.190
98.0 1135 13736 5102 3.714
100.7 1104 14040 49652 3.246
101.5 1096 15936 49261 3.091
183.1 1079 17015 48497 2.852
104.2 1567 1802 47935 2.654
185.4 1055 19137 47438 2.479
106.7 1042 20179 46860 2.322
108.1 1029 21208 46253 2.181
109.9 1012 2228 A5496 2.043
113.1 983 2323 44209 1.905
Voi.es I' Event of Sr' iel
Twenty years Premiers $22240 $2323
Dividends to Policyo-ers No. NooneTotal Premeres 20 Years $22240 $2320
Ger-eted Cash V ole 15500 Adiusted 17 -
Difference $6740-- $9499
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AJio...mt of holho-I4Po$ a-oe of Life lo~oe (P .d4.s ot of gooh and Coh VUo) t Po o:ho.liq power of P-1n.- Pd.eod 1947-67.
Coosoptica h1 . , oopiIed ywhob o Loaol 1y<01.tic 1957-59= 100. -o Ho4bo-kt of Boo. E1%&oi $1otlo.. 1963.
SW.M9 O.dinory Lif., Ag. 35,i,. byTh. Ho utua l Lifo I -oeooo Co. (Participatig bost) 1947. S oce: Flitoft Cocner 1947& 967.
II.ookoo 9014 . .J;m So:Il. p~oo..4. Po01";. -t~ 3 f Aoo P1d..o. 1o4.o. 0.01005.. t
i 0u0 k. 1 1.¢ OMd o Ca~Io. PCOO~n jM It Pr 51 1.to0-a4 p0 ,0 0 I,. tn.o*.IO" Pqcof. PPflwt tow .. 51 0.1 f,
1 $ £133.810 $13. $567.59 6.353 $ $131.00 $1332.00 77.8 $1776.00 $1776.30 $64504.00 36.3%3
247.00 1135.0 2517.59 56264.30 19.970 247.00 113500 2517.00 8. 1354.59 3130.00 5994500 19.152
3 264.00 1115.5M 3632.59 50231.59 13.844 233.50 1143.50 365 83.0 1334.00 451409 6054=50 13412
4 231.00 1101.00 4733.00 502550 10.627 248.00 134.90 4799.5 83.8 1353.59 5867.00 50078.59 10.223
5 293.50 1083. 5816.5 50316.50 8.651 263.00 1119.0 5918.56 90.5 1236.0 7103.00 5555.00 7.821
6 316.50 1065.5 682.59 56335.59 7.314 278.50 1103.50 7033.00 92.5 1193.00 8396.00 54409.00 6.55
7 335.00 1047.00 799.00 503SI.0 6.350 323.50 1053.50 8075.50 93.2 1130.00 942600 54026.00 5.73
8 351.00 183100 S90.00 50367.50 5.621 352.00 103.00 9105.50 93.6 1100.59 1053.00 5331.00 5.114
9 367.50 1014.55 9074.50 50333.0 5.051 35.5 996.50 101920 93.3 1068.00 194M5 54023.0 4.660
10 333.56 993.50 10972.59 5040.50 4.593. 40.00 974.00 110760 94.7 109.00 1262300 53 .0 4.221
11 4ID-50 981.50 11954.50 50417.00 4.217 456.00 936.59 12012.00 98.0 955.59 13578.59 51519.0 3.794
1" 417.00 965.00 12919.50 50433.0 3.904 40350 83.50 125.50 100.7 597.00 14565.59 50163.00 3.444
13 433.50 94550 ]36.59 50450.50 3.A33 51.50 867.50 13773.59 101.5 855.00 15639.00 49801.00 3.230
14 450.50 931.50 14799.50 50467.50 3.410 548.50 833.50 1460650 103.1 808.00 1622&0 49056.00 3.023
1 46750 91.50 15714.00 50484.50 3.213 576.56 805.50 15412.00 104.2 773.00 1701.00 4567.00 3.8.17
1 45450 897.5 1661150 5051.50 3.040 66. 775.50 16187.59 105.4 736.00 I7737.50 45936.59 .709
17 50150 590.50 17492.0 50518.00 2.853 629.50 752.56 16940.00 106.7 705.59 18443.59 47521.00 2.577
18 518.00 864.5 18356.00 54535.00 2.753 706.50 677.50 1761750 103.1 627.59 19069.00 46923.00 .461
19 53S.00 847.0 1903.00 5655150 3.632 729.50 652. 18270.00 109.9 594.00 1966300 46339.00 2351
23 55150 830.50 233. 50563.00 2.54 56. 576.09 18846.00 113.1 509.00 30172.00 44945.00 3.223
56= 833 736
19436.59 44M9.00 .275
Vo..t In Eoot of ooArolo
T-ty Yo.- Gons P-1-o $V7640.00 S3764.00
L.. 2D Ye-s D A&.d. llusoot.
4
, 1947) 8171.5 Leoss- D d d Aoooolly Paid 9636.50
lNt Po I Illott.4 $19460.50 $158350 $19406.05
____ Csh V.I- 1903600 19036 00 19836 16310
Diffl ce (, tG.oCn.9.) $.432.50 U1032.50 113.1 $ 2605.0D
